This paper examines the pro…tability of horizontal merger in an open economy. We …nd that duopoly is a necessary, but not su¢ cient, condition for domestic merger to be pro…table. A cross-border merger, however, can be pro…table from any market structure.
Introduction
In an important contribution to the literature on incentives for …rms to merge, Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) establish that a bilateral merger from an initial Cournot equilibrium with linear demand is unpro…table, except in the case of duopoly. One strand of subsequent research has explored conditions that might augment the profitability of merger, such as the existence of cost savings (Perry and Porter, 1985) , product di¤erentiation advantages (Deneckere and Davidson, 1985) or more complex (non-linear) demand functions (Cheung, 1992 and Faulí-Oller, 1997) . In this paper we revert to Salant, Switzer and Reynolds's constant cost, homogeneous product, 1 linear demand framework to examine the pro…tability of merger in an open economy. More speci…cally, we ask: for what con…gurations of market structure and trade costs, if any, will merger be pro…table? Using a two-country model, we consider both within-country ("domestic") and cross-border ("international") mergers. We …nd that, under trade conditions, duopoly is a necessary, but no longer su¢ cient, condition for pro…table domestic merger, but international merger can be pro…table from any market structure. 1 
The Model
We consider a homogeneous product which can be produced and consumed in either, or both, of two countries, i; j = 1; 2; i 6 = j: We suppose that each country has an identical linear inverse demand function
Production costs comprise a constant marginal cost which is the same for all …rms and, for simplicity, set to zero. In addition, exports are subject to a trade cost, t, per unit of output. We let n i and n j denote the number of …rms located in countries i and j respectively. We assume that the outcome of competition between …rms is a Cournot equilibrium in quantities and that there is no arbitrage. This implies that the price prevailing in country i can di¤er from that in country j by more than t.
Pro…ts for a representative …rm based in country i are given by
where y i denotes the sales of a …rm in country i to its home market and x i its exports to country j.
The problem of a representative …rm in country i is to maximise (2), holding outputs of rival …rms …xed and subject to non-negativity constraints on x i and y i .
We assume, henceforth, that domestic output is strictly positive in equilibrium. The …rst order conditions, using an asterisk to denote Cournot equilibrium values, for this problem are
and
where a right hand brace indicates a pair of complementary inequalities, one of which must hold with equality.
Noting that P i is a function of y i and x j alone, whilst P j is a function of y j and x i alone, conditions (3) and (4) can be solved simultaneously to yield
and y i (n i ; n j ) = (a + n j t)=(n i + n j + 1), x j (n i; n j ) > 0;
In the case where exports from both countries are zero, (5) -(6) reduce to the standard conditions for Cournot equilibrium in each country in which …rms make pro…ts of
By inspection of (5), the maximum trade cost compatible with international trade 3 taking place (i.e. x i ; x j > 0) is given by t < max a n i + 1 ; a n j + 1 t
and for the symmetric case where n i = n j = n this threshold level of trade cost is t = a n + 1 :
For an equilibrium involving trade, substitution from (5) and (6) into (1) and (2), after some rearrangement, yields:
It is convenient to decompose this pro…t into the elements deriving from the home and overseas markets. For a …rm located in country i, we denote these pro…ts as i i (n i ; n j ; t) and j i (n i ; n j ; t) respectively and note that i (n i ; n j ; t) i i (n i ; n j ; t) + j i (n i ; n j ; t): Substitution from (5) and (6) into (1) yields
Similarly for a …rm in country j; j (n i ; n j ; t) j j (n i ; n j ; t) + i j (n i ; n j ; t); where
4
Merger under Trade
We consider …rst an initial equilibrium with trade taking place and consider two possible forms of merger. In what we term a domestic merger two …rms in country i form a single …rm and in what we term an international merger one …rm in country i joins with one …rm in country j:
With a domestic merger two …rms forgo their individual pro…ts i (n i ; n j ; t) but take a share of pro…ts that are enhanced through the reduction in domestic competition. Thus, the gain to a domestic merger in a trade equilibrium in which n i = n j = n, can be written as
With an international merger, we need to consider three types of …rms. Following such a merger there will be n 1 …rms located wholly in country i, n 1 …rms located in country j and one newly merged …rm which has a production base in each country. The newly merged …rm is not the same as existing …rms in that it can supply either market from a domestic production unit. Therefore, in setting its output in each country it can act like a domestic …rm in that country; there is no incentive for it to produce for export because by producing domestically it can save trade costs. The multinational …rm's impact on total production can therefore be deduced by analogy with a Cournot equilibrium in which domestic output in country i is determined as if there are n domestic Cournot competitors and n 1 overseas competitors, whilst output for export from country i is determined as if there are n 1 …rms competing over exports facing n overseas competitors. The position in country j is symmetric to this. International merger, therefore, has the e¤ect of reducing by one the number of exporters serving each market but leaving the number of domestic producers unchanged. Thus, the gain to an international merger in a trade equilibrium in which n i = n j = n, can be written as
In their autarky setting, Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) demonstrate that a merger is pro…table only if there are two …rms in the initial Cournot equilibrium.
Does this result hold under trade? Proposition 1 addresses this question in regard to
domestic and international merger.
Proposition 1 For domestic merger, G D (n; t) < 0 for all n and 0 t < t whilst for international merger there exists a threshold level of trade costs, b t I (n) such that
Proof. Setting n i = n j = n, substituting from (11) and (12) into G D (n; t) and di¤erentiating with resect to t the resulting …rst order condition implies that G D (n; t)
is maximised at a trade cost of t(n) = a 2n 2 +2n+1
. Substitution of this value of t into G D (n; t) shows that the latter is negative for n 2 thus establishing the result for domestic merger. After setting n i = n j = n, substituting from (11) and (12) into G I (n; t) and equating to zero, the critical (zero-gain) value of trade cost can be solved for as b t I (n) = : For all n 2, b t I (n) lies in the range (0; t ): Since, as can readily be con…rmed, G I (n; t) is negative at t = 0, concave and approaches zero from above as t approaches t it follows that b t I (n) constitutes a threshold such that G I (n; t) < 0 when t < b t I (n), but G 1 (n; t) > 0 when b t I (n) < t < t , thus con…rming the result for international merger.
The Proposition establishes that from an initial equilibrium in which there is international trade then, whatever the market structure, there is no incentive for domestic merger. However, with an international merger the situation is somewhat di¤erent. Speci…cally, the Proposition admits the possibility that mergers from even 
Merger Initiating Trade
When a merger takes place from autarky (i.e. t > t ) the resulting change in market structure may initiate trade. To understand this e¤ect, let X i and X j denote the total volume of exports from i to j and j to i respectively. Using (5) for the representative …rm in i; and an equivalent expression for that in j, these are given by
and X j (n i ; n j ; t) = n j (a t(n i + 1))
With a symmetric initial structure with n …rms in each country, the ‡ows of exports from i to j and j to i following a domestic merger in country i are, respectively,
(a t(n + 1))(n 1) 2n
and X D j (n; t) = max 0;
Inspection of (19) and (20) reveals that the former is positive for t < t whilst the latter is positive for t < t A where
Thus, if t lies in the range t < t < t A a domestic merger in country i will initiate a one-way ‡ow of trade from j to i.
Consider now an international merger. As explained above, this has the e¤ect of reducing by one the number of exporters serving each market but leaving the number of domestic producers unchanged. Assuming a symmetric initial structure with n …rms in each country and using, (17) and (18), we can write the post-merger trade ‡ows as
and X I j (n; t) = max 0;
(a t(n + 1))(n 1) 2n :
For either of these ‡ows to be positive requires t < t , which is the same condition that pertained pre-merger. An international merger will thus neither initiate, nor cause the cessation of, trading.
We may thus consider whether from a position of autarky, but where t < t A , a domestic merger is pro…table. The gain from such a merger is
and, in rather special circumstances, this may be positive as the following Proposition establishes.
Proposition 2 For n = 2 there exists a threshold level of trade costs, b t D , such that
In all other circumstances, G DA (n; t) < 0.
Proof. After setting n i = n j = n, substituting from (11) and (7) into G DA (n; t) reveals directly that this is negative for n > 2: Setting n = 2 and solving G DA (n; t) = 0 for t yields a critical (zero-gain) value for trade cost of
is increasing in t it follows that for b t D < t < t A (n) it is positive, thus establishing the claim.
The Proposition demonstrates that for trade costs in the range where a domestic merger would initiate trade, duopoly is a necessary but not su¢ cient condition for the merger to be pro…table. This contrasts to the position under autarky where, as established by Salant Switzer and Reynolds, a bilateral merger from duopoly is always pro…table.
Conclusions
In their autarky setting, Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) demonstrated that a merger would be pro…table if there were two …rms in the initial Cournot equilibrium, but not if there were three or more …rms. We show that in an open economy with international trade, the condition for a domestic merger to be pro…table becomes more restrictive. Speci…cally, duopoly is no longer a su¢ cient condition for a merger to be pro…table; an additional requirement is that trade costs exceed a threshold level.
An international merger, by contrast, can be pro…table from any market structure, provided again that trade costs lie in a certain range.
